Don't neglect the Spratlys
The writer is a research assistant in the China
Studies Department of the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York
When the Asean Regional Forum, or ARF, met this
summer to discuss security concerns facing the
Asia-Pacific region, not surprisingly, terrorism, Kashmir
and the Korean peninsula dominated the agenda. Sadly,
unresolved territorial claims to the Spratly Islands, an
increasingly volatile flashpoint, received only token
consideration. The continual lack of substantial progress
on this issue threatens to march East Asia closer to
disaster.
Rich in minerals, oil, natural gas and fish, the sea lanes
of the South China Sea--passage for one-quarter of
global trade--are an attractive prize for the six players
with claims to the Spratlys: Brunei, China, Malaysia,
Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. An outbreak of
conflict would impact every member of the Asia-Pacific
community and would have a negative rippling effect on
the global economy. Thankfully, clashes among those in
Southeast Asia have been very minor and needn't be
much fretted about.
The primary source of concern is China. China's
"creeping assertiveness" into the 200 islets and reefs,
along with its unwillingness to negotiate multilaterally,
has left the other claimants with little recourse. In 1995,
China built a small "outpost" on Mischief Reef--the
Pentagon argues that it bears the look of a future
military installation--that has since led to periodic
skirmishes between China and both Vietnam and the
Philippines. Just recently, Vietnam accused China of
conducting military exercises with live ammunition in
Vietnamese waters.
Yet, at the moment, international attention has strayed
from issues involving the South China Sea. Already
frequently avoided or shelved, the dispute in the area is
difficult to discuss given the differing diplomatic styles of
the states involved. In particular, China does not easily
consent to Southeast Asia's multilateral approach
because of its sensitivity to national sovereignty. China
did agree to approach the issue multilaterally in
1995--itself a huge achievement--but in every attempt
at progress since, Beijing has nonetheless emerged as
the main impediment.
In principle, the claimants have agreed on a code of
conduct that would govern movements in the region,
but this has yet to emerge in practice because of
China's consistent disagreements over certain clauses.
Working with China in a regional forum understandably
is a slow process, but as issues over the South China
Sea are downplayed, China feels less pressured to
accommodate any external demand. But as time passes
and more parties build "outposts," compromise will
become more difficult as it will necessitate withdrawal
and loss of face.
As the Chinese stake their claims it has been equally
hard to rein these in, so efforts have centred on
"confidence-building." But this has yielded limited
results. Resources and the steadfast defence of national
sovereignty fuel the dispute, international law struggles
to make sense of the claims--China's is based on
"archaeological" evidence that supposedly proves the
islands were always a part of the Chinese
"motherland"--and regional discussions avoid the
debate for fear of halting progress elsewhere.
Yet for all that, the South China Sea must be made a
higher priority. The international community has learned
that China will participate in policy or dialogue when it
perceives enough self-benefit. In the Spratlys, however,
China's intentions involve both resources and rank.
Accordingly, to entice it to the table, negotiations must
appeal to China's desire for a leadership role in Asia.
Perhaps then it would be feasible to convince China of
proposals to share the resources of the area rather than
assert military might over all of it. In other words, the
goal is to get China to agree on cooperation that would
result in joint development and joint benefactors,
instead of focusing on intransigence.
As the Spratlys simmer on the back burner, other
problems grab the spotlight. This has happened before.
Challenges like terrorism were not addressed
appropriately when first identified; now they have
greatly intensified and handling them will cost
governments far more than it initially would have. If
China's expansionist tendencies are not checked, the
Spratlys will one day join this list of issues that rightly
should have attracted more early attention.
Unfortunately, restoring peace following an eruption in
the South China Sea would be extremely costly.
By Matt Williams - The Far Eastern Economic Review - September 19, 2002.
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