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Thunder from the Highlands

Ethnic unrest in Vietnam's central highlands may trigger tighter controls and a tense leadership struggle centred on the Communist Party chief

HANOI - The central nervous system of Vietnam's body politic suffered a profound shock in early February. Nothing had prepared the Hanoi leadership for an ethnic-minority uprising in the central highlands, where an estimated 5,000 protesters turned out to clamour for the return of ancestral lands, among other demands. While those numbers are paltry by Indonesian or Philippine standards, the protests exposed an embarrassing hole in the security apparatus, which was bolstered by Communist Party Secretary-General Le Kha Phieu and his allies in the armed forces. Phieu and military leaders appear bent on using the worst unrest in years as a springboard to reassert the dominance of political conservatives in the name of national stability and unity. Some analysts predict a tightening of controls, including further restrictions on local and foreign media and stricter surveillance of foreign-funded development projects. Party suspicions that foreign intervention led to the unrest heighten a xenophobic mood, say party insiders.

"This certainly strengthens the role of the army," says a high-ranking party member. "The leadership is linking all these events with some 'hostile forces.' There are indications that they will use this as a pretext to increase repression." "This is not good for the reformers," says a Vietnamese publisher. "With peace, you can change very quickly. But when something like this happens, it's harmful for the democratization of Vietnam." With the Communist Party Central Committee this week immersed in negotiations over who will lead for the next five years, the protests could hardly have come at a more critical time. In late October, senior party advisers criticized Phieu for weak leadership. Some now believe that the highlands unrest could be used as "another arrow against him," as one diplomat put it. Alternatively, however, Phieu's firm response could rally conservative support within the central committee and revive his bid to hang on to his job.

Ironically, the ethnic troubles could boost the prospects of National Assembly Chairman Nong Duc Manh moving to a more prominent role, even the presidency. Manh, a northern ethnic Tay and deft politician broadly popular from televised assembly sessions, is perceived by many party members as a "unifying factor" for the nation. The highlands unrest highlighted the party's trust in Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a former deputy minister of public security. By choosing him to spearhead damage control in the highlands, party leaders strengthened a widespread view that Dung is the front runner to replace Phan Van Khai as prime minister after the Ninth Party Congress, tentatively scheduled for late March.

Dung was dispatched to the highlands after panicked provincial leaders in Daklak and Gia Lai provinces were overwhelmed by thousands of Ede, Giarai and other ethnic-minority protesters who took to the streets on February 2-6. The demonstrators were fed up with northern migrants--from both the Kinh majority and other ethnic minorities--encroaching on their land and culture, some sources in the provinces and Hanoi say. By some accounts, the protesters asked for political autonomy, freedom to practise their Protestant faith and the return of ancestral lands confiscated for coffee plantations. It took a battery of troops, riot police and water cannon to disperse the crowds, mostly concentrated in Pleiku, Gia Lai's provincial capital.

Protests hit all the hot button

But extinguishing the sparks elsewhere wasn't so easy. "The demonstrators changed strategy," says one source in Daklak. "They focused on the districts and communes, which are more difficult to control." Such tactics prompted the military to mount a more sustained campaign in the countryside to prevent embittered minorities from overthrowing village-level authorities, the sources say. Provincial party leaders elsewhere were warned to keep close watch on minority movements, lest the unrest spread. The politburo held a special session on February 10 to review the events. While rising tensions over land are well-documented, the precise catalyst for the unrest--and more important, the chief organizing force behind them--is shrouded in mystery. Fears of increased migration spread in late January with word that 100,000 people are slated for resettlement in Daklak and Gia Lai because of the $3 billion Son La hydropower project, according to a source connected with it. The government maintains that the protests flared after two minority representatives were briefly detained. All in all, 20 people were arrested. No deaths were reported but state-run media said some police were injured and hospitalized.

Not surprisingly, the government barred foreign journalists from visiting the area. Phone contact was also severely curtailed, since the politburo instructed provincial leaders to prevent local officials, local journalists and members of local organizations from talking to the foreign press. What's clear is that the demonstrators managed to push all of Vietnam's hot buttons simultaneously: land rights, ethnic-minority status, religious freedom and political autonomy. That simultaneous barrage renders this episode profoundly more threatening to the regime than a series of protests in Thai Binh province in 1997. In that case, several thousand farmers from the Kinh group took to the streets to rail against embezzlement and other misconduct by local officials. Senior party officials went to the area to listen to the farmers and address grievances. Some corrupt officials were later punished. While that conflict didn't have international repercussions, the highlands mess quickly aroused international passions, played across Internet sites run by United States-based émigré groups. It was bad enough that the protests occurred shortly before the party congress, but even worse in the run-up to a February 13 hearing in Washington by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Publicly, both Vietnamese and U.S. officials vowed that the episode would not derail the planned ratification of the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement. But on both sides, apprehension over religious controversy lingers.

"If NTR [normal trade relations] were denied on human-rights/religious-freedom grounds, this would create a self-fulfilling prophecy for party ideologues," Vietnam scholar Carlyle Thayer told the hearing. "They would see it as a vindication of their oft-repeated warnings about the 'threat of peaceful evolution' under which hostile external forces collude with dissenters inside Vietnam to bring down the communist regime." Back in Hanoi, Communist Party leaders fume that some of those arrested were, according to foreign media reports quoting local officials, former leaders of the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, or Fulro, a hill-tribe guerilla group that supported the Americans during the Vietnam War. Government spokeswoman Phan Thuy Thanh told reporters on February 15 that Fulro no longer exists. But party insiders say the leadership is perturbed by rumours that former guerrillas got U.S. funds to pay demonstrators.

A U.S. embassy spokesman in Hanoi told the Review: "The U.S. government is not funding, supporting or encouraging any violent, anti-government activities in Vietnam." Despite the new chill, some aid workers still hope the unrest will spur the government to allow minorities a greater role in planning their own futures. "If there's a move to understand the underlying forces, it can be something positive," says a development worker. As the government saw in Thai Binh back in 1997, dialogue works better than silence.

By Margot Cohen - The Far Eastern Economic Review - February 22, 2001.